The effectiveness of American civil-military relations has often been characterized by the degree of friction between competing preferences during the decision-making process. But how do these preferences converge or diverge based on the duration or type of security crisis? Although much has been written on the general friction between civilian and military elites, there has yet to be a thorough exploration into how decision-making processes are affected by varying types of security challenges. I argue that long-term challenges, such as counterinsurgencies or counterterrorism campaigns, create polycentric arrangements where contrasting strategies are pursued by self-forming decision-making networks within the national security bureaucracy. In this case, the friction between civilian and military leaders might not matter as much as diverging preferences between organizations within the interagency. I use the Institutional Analysis and Development framework to map these polycentric arrangements to better understand their impact on policy outcomes. Using the Institutional Grammar 2.0 to analyze two foundational pieces of national security legislation, initial results indicate that the absence of certain institutional rules may facilitate ad hoc networks that work independent of formal decision-making processes. These findings imply that policy decisions made by civilian and military elites are likely reshaped or dismantled within the bureaucratic system, thus leading to disparate approaches and strategies during long-term security challenges. Future research will map both formal and informal decision-making networks (Networked Action Situations) with data extracted from legislation (formal) and interviews (informal) using the IG 2.0 to better understand when and how ad hoc networks emerge.
To provide the best experiences, we use technologies like cookies to store and/or access device information. Consenting to these technologies will allow us to process data such as browsing behavior or unique IDs on this site. Not consenting or withdrawing consent, may adversely affect certain features and functions.
The technical storage or access is strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user, or for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network.
The technical storage or access is necessary for the legitimate purpose of storing preferences that are not requested by the subscriber or user.
The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for statistical purposes.The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for anonymous statistical purposes. Without a subpoena, voluntary compliance on the part of your Internet Service Provider, or additional records from a third party, information stored or retrieved for this purpose alone cannot usually be used to identify you.
The technical storage or access is required to create user profiles to send advertising, or to track the user on a website or across several websites for similar marketing purposes.