How do the interactions between bureaucratic organizations shape strategic decision-making during counterinsurgencies? Although similar questions about bureaucratic behavior have been explored regarding short term crises, empirical examinations of these interactions during long term conflicts have been less prolific. Yet studying bureaucratic interactions offers an opportunity to better understand the challenges associated with counterinsurgencies. This is especially salient following the U.S. failure in Afghanistan but can also apply to the dynamics of long term conflict in general. By going beyond the focus on bureaucratic politics at the level of elite decision-makers during periods of crisis, this study seeks to explore how the interactions between bureaucratic organizations might affect coordination and cooperation as strategies develop, unfold, and evolve during long, drawn-out conflicts. Using institutional grammar to gather data from formal legislation, as well as from interview transcripts from participants of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, this study employs network analysis to examine both formal and informal defense decision-making institutions. The results of this research indicate that bureaucratic organizations form ad hoc networks during counterinsurgencies, which differ from interactions mandated by legislation and presidential directives. Specifically, these ad hoc networks tend to favor trust building measures to facilitate cooperation, especially in the area of strategic assessment where there is a gap in formalized interactions. The findings imply that strategic processes during long term conflicts are incomplete and that collective action problems are addressed through informal interactions rather than through formalized processes.